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ARTICLES
Black Men, Red Men, and the
Constitution of 1787: A Bicentennial
Apology From a Middle Templar*
By Louis F. CLAIBORNE**
Introduction
Amid all the excitement surrounding the bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, it is not inappropriate to remember two of the Fram-
ers' most serious oversights: the exclusions of the Black and Native
American populations from the body politic.1 The two races then ac-
counted for more than one quarter of the total population existing 200
years ago.2
* In large part, this Article is an edited version of a lecture delivered at the University of
Essex, Wivenhoe, England, in November 1981.
** Of Counsel, Washburn & Kemp, San Francisco; Barrister (Middle Temple).
1. Justice Thurgood Marshall eloquently discussed the constitutional exclusion of the
black man last year. See Justice T. Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San
Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Ass'n, Maui, Hawaii (May 6, 1987), published as Re-
flections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
2. According to the Census of 1790, the total population of the United States (then
bounded on the west by the Mississippi and excluding Florida) was just under four million,
including 700,000 black slaves. See, e.g., 1 S. MORISON, H. COMMAGER, & W.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 262 & n.1 (7th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter S. MORISON]. These figures do not take into account the tribal Indians living
within the borders of the New Republic; their number is only estimated here. It has been
surmised that there were some one or two million Indians in North America in the sixteenth
century, most of them presumably east of the Mississippi. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE BOOK
OF INDIANS 110 (A. Josephy ed. 1961). In 1900, the Indian population of the United States
was only 250,000, but this represented a radical reduction of the total from a century earlier,
attributable to intervening "disease, conquest, mass executions, oppression, decay and assimi-
lation." Id. at 403. Today, the Indian population is about one million. D. GETCHES, D.
ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 7 (1979).
The total population of the so-called Civilized Tribes in the lower South (Creeks, Choctaws,
Chickasaws, and Cherokees, but not the Seminoles in Florida) is fairly accurately fixed at just
over 60,000 in 1800. J. SWANTON, EARLY HISTORY OF THE CREEK INDIANS AND THEIR
NEIGHBORS 438,442-43,449,451,456(1922); G. FOREMAN, THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 7,
211 (1934). Given these widely separated landmarks, it seems not unreasonable to guess at an
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The Framers promulgated these exclusions behind the backs of the
Blacks and Native Americans, whom they did not invite to the Philadel-
phia Convention. Nor were there any women-which may have affected
the outcome of the issues discussed below.3 But there were lots of law-
yers. Out of the fifty-five delegates who attended,4 almost two-thirds had
been trained in the law-even if they were not all practicing lawyers.5
And five of these had been called to the bar by the Honourable Society of
the Middle Temple in London.
6
When I say Blacks and Native Americans were "excluded from the
body politic," I do not mean merely that they were denied the franchise.
At that time, the right to vote was universally restricted to propertied
adult males' and was left to the states to regulate.' Rather, the Constitu-
tion of 1787 excluded black and red people in a much more fundamental
sense: they were not deemed citizens of the United States. They had no
civil rights except as conceded to them by the states, and thus enjoyed no
constitutional protection from ill treatment at the hands of federal or
state authorities. The drafters of the Constitution affirmed the status of
Blacks as chattel and Native Americans as aliens in their own land.
These were serious scars on the fundamental charter of the new nation,
which loudly proclaimed the liberty and equality of man.
Most students of American history have apologized for the Framers
by arguing that they were prisoners of their time. On the slave trade,
Professor Brogan has written: "It might have been better for the United
Indian population of some 500,000 in 1790, within the then-existing boundaries of the United
States.
3. It is worth speculating whether the presence of Abigail Adams, the wife of John Ad-
ams, whose intellect was much respected by Jefferson and others, would have made a differ-
ence. As early as 1774, she had stressed the inconsistency between the fight for freedom and
the continuance of black slavery. P. BERGMAN, THE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE NE-
GRO IN AMERICA 48 (M. Bergman comp. ed. 1969). She might have shamed the male dele-
gates into bolder action.
4. See A. PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 20-22 (1941).
5. W. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM 56 (1967); C. RoSSITER, 1787: THE
GRAND CONVENTION 147 (1966).
6. These were the following: Jared Ingersoll of Pennsylvania, C. ROSSITER, supra note 5,
at 107, John Dickinson of Delaware, id. at 110, John Blair of Virginia, id. at 122, John Rut-
ledge, id. at 130-31, and General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, id. at 131, both of South
Carolina. The Inner Temple contributed William Houston of Georgia, id. at 135-36. Then, as
now, the Middle Temple and the Inner Temple were two of the four English Inns of Court,
responsible for training would-be barristers and ultimately admitting them to practice.
7. See P. STOREY, OUR UNALIENABLE RIGHTS 47-49 (1965).
8. The only federal officers to be chosen by direct popular election under the original
Constitution were Representatives. But the relevant provision specified that "the Electors in
each State", for this purpose, were to have "the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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States if it had been taken up and disposed of in 1787, once and for all;
but it was not possible." 9 Others might conclude, pointing to the evasion
of the post-Civil War amendments in the case of Blacks and the hundred
broken treaties in the case of the Indians, that subsequent history would
have been no different if the Constitution had treated Blacks and Native
Americans more generously.
I am not convinced on either point. I think the Founding Fathers
could have used their skills to avoid or at least substantially attenuate
two cruel and degrading aspects of our history. Law cannot overcome all
social pressures and prejudices, but, if stated with unequivocal clarity, it
can withstand a great many--especially in a country where the federal
courts are usually willing to take on unpopular causes. I will consider
whether it is realistic to suppose that the Framers might have dealt with
Blacks and Native Americans in a significantly different way.
I distinguish between the two cases. The Framers' treatment of the
Blacks and Indians demonstrated the common prejudice of the time
against non-white people, and the common idea that the black and red
men were "children of nature" or "savages." But beyond excluding the
two races from the body politic, the Constitution deals very differently
with Blacks and Indians. The operative causes are not the same. Fur-
thermore, the resulting treatment of each race was quite distinct. I shall
accordingly look separately at the two racial situations.
I. The Constitution and the Black Man
The Constitution does not explicitly draw any racial line excluding
the Blacks. The relevant provisions of the original charter"° deal with
slaves of any color. Indian slavery had, however, been abandoned in the
North American colonies for years, and white slavery was unknown.
The Constitution thus can only mean Blacks when it refers to "other
Persons" who are neither "free" nor merely "bound to Service for a
9. H. BROGAN, LONGMAN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 205 (1985).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 provides, in part, that apportionment of representatives
to Congress and for direct taxes "shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I provides:
The Migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
[1808], but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
dollars for each Person.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 provides:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to
whom such Service or Labour may be due.
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Term of Years."' The Constitution also does not expressly discriminate
against Blacks who are not slaves. However, this did not deter Chief
Justice Taney, writing for the majority some seventy years later in the
infamous Dred Scott case. 2 He found that free Blacks, just like slaves,
were not intended by the Framers to be included as "a portion of [the]
people,"'" "constituent members of [the] sovereignty," 14 or "citizens of
the United States",' 5 but were regarded as "so far inferior, that they had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect .... 1 Regardless
of the correctness of Justice Taney's assertions, it is obvious that the sta-
tus of free Blacks-then numbering only some 60,00017-was substan-
tially affected and overshadowed by the sanction given to the slavery of
approximately three quarters of a million black brothers."8
A. The Apportionment Clause
The Constitution first defines black slaves at the beginning of the
document. They are delicately referred to as "other Persons" other than
"free Persons," persons "bound to Service for a Term of Years," and
"Indians not taxed."' 9 Slaves were counted to the extent of "three-
fifths" of a person in computing the number of Representatives each state
could send to Congress and the proportion of "direct taxes" it could be
asked to contribute to the national government.20
Six months later, in The Federalist,2' James Madison bravely sought
to justify this odd formula by noting that a slave was, under law, re-
garded as both property and person but not wholly either. He claimed it
was reasonable to treat "the slave as divested of two-fifth of the man,"
and therefore, as three-fifths of a person.22 More modem commentators
view the apportionment as a simple compromise, combining the advan-
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Indians were also excluded from the category of "other
Persons." See supra note 10.
12. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). In Dred Scott, the Court extended
constitutional protection to slaveholders' property rights, under a substantive due process the-
ory. The Court held that neither Congress nor the states had power to grant citizenship to
slaves or their descendants.
13. Id. at 404.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 407.
17. Franklin, A Brief History of the Negro in the United States, in I THE AMERICAN
NEGRO REFERENCE BOOK 48 (J. Davis ed. 1966); P. BERGMAN, supra note 3, at 68.
18. See supra note 2.
19. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. See supra note 10.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. See supra note 10.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
22. Id. at 367-69.
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tage to the South of increasing their representation with the penalty of
similarly increasing their monetary contribution.23 But the matter was
not so straightforward.
The "three-fifths" question was only a subissue in the main debate
about how "national" the new government should be4-a question fi-
nally resolved by treating the states as equal in one branch of the Legisla-
ture (the Senate) and unequal in the other (the House of
Representatives).25 Although the subissue itself occupied many days of
discussion,26 its resolution was more an accident than intended. There
was much floundering, considerable posturing, a few moments of true
eloquence, some apparently contradictory votes,27 and every opportunity
for a determined and far-sighted schemer to sell an innocuous solution.
Several alternatives were possible, and many of them were mentioned,28
but no one really took the lead. The obvious resolution, agreeable to the
southern states, was to make both taxes and representation depend on
the total population, without separate reference to the slaves.29 This
solution made no appreciable difference in the voting power of the slave
states at that time and avoided the express constitutional recognition of
slavery.
Although there was plainly no chance of achieving a constitutional
abolition of slavery if the southern states were to be part of a Union, the
delegates from the North, especially those who spoke out against con-
doning black slavery, most likely saw some virtue in counting the slaves
as whole "inhabitants." Counting the slaves as whole, and not fractional,
inhabitants would have added only six members to the southern bloc
over the next dozen years. This addition would not have created a major-
23. See H. BROGAN, supra note 9, at 205-06.
24. For a discussion of the three-fifths question as a subissue of the debate over represen-
tation of the States in the national government, see E. DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 70-71 (1964).
25. For a discussion of the debate and the resolution, called the Great Compromise, see C.
RossrrER, supra note 5, at 186-95, 196-97. See also E. DUMBAULD, supra note 24, at 68-73.
26. See E. DUMBAULD, supra note 24, at 68-73.
27. W. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 184-87; E. DUMBAULD, supra note 24, at 68-73.
28. See E. DUMBAULD, supra note 24, at 70-71; see also W. MURPHY, supra note 5, at
185.
29. Even after taxation and representation had been tied together, South Carolina, joined
by Georgia, urged counting the whole number of slaves for apportionment purposes. See 1 M.
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 596
(rev. ed. 1966). Perhaps these states rightly foresaw that, at least for the next century, there
would be no "direct taxes" imposed by Congress, federal revenue being raised instead by excise
taxes and duties.
ity vote for the southern states.3" Moreover, the northern states had the
immediate prospect of increasing the imbalance in their favor when new
states were carved out of the Northwest Territory, where slavery was
banned by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.31 Finally, conceding on
the southern representation claim might have gained the northern states
a few credit points in the subsequent argument on the slave trade.
Why was this solution, or some other scheme that avoided constitu-
tional recognition of slavery, not embraced?32 In part, the answer lies
with precedent. The three-fifths formula, although never ratified by the
state legislatures, had been put forward six years earlier by an almost
unanimous Continental Congress. It was first proposed as an amend-
ment to the Articles of Confederation in an effort to substitute popula-
tion for landed wealth as the basis for taxing the states.33 The Framers
easily utilized an already familiar formula34 to apply to representation as
well as taxation.35
30. The apportionment of Representatives, on the basis of the 1790 Census and the three-
fifths rule, was made by the Act of Apr. 14, 1792, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 253, to take effect for the
Third Congress, starting March 3, 1793. Using the formula specified in this Act-one Repre-
sentative for every 33,000 inhabitants-the result of counting slaves as whole persons would
have been to accord one additional Representative each to Maryland, North Carolina, and
South Carolina, and three to Virginia, with no change for Georgia or Delaware. Thus, the
"Southern bloc", including an arbitrary two Representatives for Kentucky, see Act of Feb. 25,
1791, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 191, would have had a total of 54 votes, as against 57 for the other States,
including those of an arbitrary two Representatives for Vermont. Id. The admission of Ten-
nessee in 1796, with only one Representative through 1803, did not measurably alter the
Northern advantage. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774-
1927, at 39, 57, 62, 71 (1928) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY].
31. A complete reprint of the original Northwest Ordinance appears in 23 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 334-43 (1936). The full text of the ordinance is also reprinted
as a note in the Statutes at Large on the occasion of its reenactment by Congress after the
ratification of the Constitution. See 1 Stat. 51(a) (1789). In 1787, it was probably assumed that
the regime of the Northwest Ordinance would also be applied to any ceded territory south of
the Ohio River. But the North would have retained a comfortable majority under a rule
counting the full number of slaves, at least through 1820, despite the admission of Kentucky,
Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama as slave States. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra
note 30, at 39.
32. It could have been possible to avoid a constitutional recognition of slavery by basing
representation on citizenship or the right of suffrage as determined by each state.
33. Act of Apr. 18, 1783, to Amend Art. VIII, 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 260-61 (1922). See E. DUMBAULD, supra note 24, at 47 n.51, 70, 190 n.25; 3 M.
FARRAND, supra note 29, at 160.
34. See, e.g., 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 160.
35. See B. MITCHELL & L. MITCHELL, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 11-12 (2d ed. 1975). In the context of monetary contributions, of course, the
interests of North and South were reversed. Since representation in the Continental Congress
was to remain equal under the Articles of Confederation art. V (1781, repealed 1787), the slave
states initially opposed counting slaves at all while the North wanted them fully counted. The
fractional counting compromise resulted. For an earlier debate respecting the propriety of
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 15:269
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The decisive factor against treating slaves as full inhabitants was the
short-sightedness of the outspoken enemies of slavery, lawyers from Mas-
sachussetts and Pennsylvania. Thus, Gouveneur Morris, in the midst of
an impassioned speech against the constitutional sanctioning of slavery,
objected to Southerners counting the slaves as inhabitants, fractionally or
otherwise. He insisted that "the people of Pennsylvania would revolt at
the idea of being put on a footing with slaves."36 While demonstrating a
lawyer's versatility in fashioning arguments, Morris hardly dealt a telling
blow for abolition. Indeed, he effectively invited the compromise ulti-
mately accepted. The truth is that certain Framers did not try very hard
to avoid giving slavery the imprimatur of the Constitution. At the very
least, they could easily have improved the Apportionment Clause.
B. The Fugitive Slave Clause
Article IV of the Constitution stipulates that, notwithstanding the
law of the asylum state, any fugitive "person held to service or labor"
shall be delivered up to his master." While this clause was undoubtedly
aimed at fugitive slaves, it is equally applicable to indentured servants
and therefore does not constitute an express constitutional recognition of
black slavery.
Justice Story later wrote that this clause "constituted a fundamental
article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been
formed."3 This statement was probably an effort to excuse the acquies-
cence of the Founding Fathers from his native Massachusetts. But the
indications are that the so-called Fugitive Slave Clause was not inevita-
ble. No comparable provision existed under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.39 South Carolina's eleventh-hour proposal of the Clause was
accepted with hardly a whimper presumably because the delegates were
exhausted by other disputes.' In short, the opponents of slavery were
simply caught napping. Again, this was an avoidable mistake.
counting slaves if population were to be the basis of financial contributions, see M. JENSEN,
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 145-50 (1963).
36. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 583. See also id. at 593.
37. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. See supra note 10.
38. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611 (1842).
39. See 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 325. The Northwest Ordinance, adopted by the
Continental Congress on July 13, 1787, however, did contain such a clause. Art. VI, 1 Stat.
5 1(a), 53 (1789). See supra note 31.
40. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 443, 446, 453-54, 628.
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C. The Slave Trade Clause
Short of achieving the political impossibility of abolishing slavery
within the Union, the most promising idea debated at the 1787 Conven-
tion was the immediate halt of the importation of new slaves. This con-
stituted perhaps the largest missed opportunity if, as I believe, it was
possible to end the slave trade straightaway.
The Constitutional provisions concerning the slave trade are quite
startling and entirely one-sided. Article I contains the Constitution's
main clause on the subject.4 In an unusual prohibition on Congressional
action, it prohibited the legislature from stopping the importation of
slaves until 1808. Article V is even more extraordinary. It states that the
Constitution itself could not be amended to remove the prohibition in
Article I prior to 1808,42 and thereby assured that the will of the majority
of the people on this matter would not prevail.
As the provisions suggest, these clauses do not represent a consen-
sus. As early as 1775 the Continental Congress had prohibited the im-
portation of slaves,43 and in 1787 ten states banned slave traffic.' It
would have been easy for the majority to outvote the three dissenting
states, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Indeed, some sen-
timent existed for either writing an immediate prohibition of the slave
trade into the Constitution or omitting any provision regarding slave
trade and leaving the issue to Congress,45 where the votes would be suf-
ficent to impose the ban. Despite their overwhelming majority, the re-
formers conceded a twenty-year moratorium on any interference in
response to the Carolinas' and Georgia's threat to refuse to join the new
Union.46 It seems that the reformers were "had" by clever lawyers, espe-
cially two Middle Templars from South Carolina, John Rutledge and
General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.4 7
41. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. See supra note 10.
42. U.S. CONST. art. V.
43. Franklin, supra note 17, at 34; 1 S. MORISON, supra note 2, at 218-19. This ban was
extended for the duration of the Revolutionary War by direction of the Congress in April
1776. H. BROGAN, supra note 9, at 185.
44. 1 S. MORISON, supra note 2, at 218-19, 245; W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 373
(1969).
45. See B. MITCHELL & L. MITCHELL, supra note 35, at 106-07; see also W. MURPHY,
supra note 5, at 185.
46. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 364, 371-72. See also C. ROssITER, supra note 5, at
268.
47. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 364, 371-72. See also C. ROSSITER, supra note 5, at
268. For a discussion of Rutledge's and Pinkney's affiliation with the Middle Temple, see
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15:269
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The Slave Trade Clause was quietly introduced by Rutledge, the
chairman, as part of the report of the Committee of Detail on August
26.48 Interestingly, the most vocal objection to thus vindicating slavery
came from delegates of the Upper South: Luther Martin of Maryland,4 9
John Dickinson, a Middle Templar from Delaware,5" George Mason and
Madison of Virginia.51 The New Englanders, such as Oliver Ellsworth
5 2
and Roger Sherman,53 seemed content to let the Clause lie. Perhaps they
were influenced by the possibility of trading such a concession for the
removal of the proposed impediments to the enactment of so-called "nav-
igation acts."54 Ultimately the most influential factor was the persistent
threat of the most southern states to refuse to join the new Union if they
did not get their way.55
At the same time, some of the southern states suggested that, if they
were left alone, their states might ban slave trade voluntarily.56 James
Wilson of Pennsylvania encouraged calling their bluff: "If South Caro-
lina and Georgia were themselves disposed to get rid of the importation
of slaves in a short time, they would never refuse to Unite because the
importation might be prohibited."57 Rufus King of Massachussetts ad-
ded that the "Northern and middle States" could no more aquiesce in
the clause than the Deep South claimed they could not live without it.58
But no one was listening. Indeed, with practically no fuss, General
Pinckney was later able to extend constitutional protection for the slave
trade eight years beyond the original date to 1808."9 John Rutledge, the
other Middle Templar representing South Carolina, secured with equal
ease the Article V provision against any amendment of the Constitution
on this score.'
I suggest that the result could have been otherwise. By 1787, every
state, except the three most southern, had absolutely prohibited the im-
48. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 177, 183. See also E. DUMBAULD, supra note 24, at
185.
49. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 364.
50. Id. at 372.
51. Id. at 370, 415, 417.
52. Id. at 364, 370-71, 375.
53. Id. at 369-70.
54. Navigation acts, in the usage of the time, could take the form of tarriffs, quotas, pref-
erences for American merchant shipping, and the like. See, e.g., C. ROSSITER, supra note 5, at
209-10, 215-18; H. BROGAN, supra note 9, at 205-06.
55. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 364, 371-73, 415-16.
56. Id. at 365, 372.
57. Id. at 372.
58. Id. at 373.
59. Id. at 415-16.
60. Id. at 559.
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portation of slaves from overseas, and even North Carolina had imposed
a substantial duty.61 South Carolina banned the trade later that year,
and renewed the ban until 1803.62 Even Georgia followed suit in 1798.63
Were these three states merely bluffing? One cannot suppose they would
have stayed apart over this issue, especially considering the weakness of
their isolation on the southern Atlantic coast, with a white population of
less than half a million between them."4 Had their bluff been called, sub-
sequent history might have been very different.
D. The Missing Territorial Clause
I turn, finally, to what I call the "Missing Territorial Clause." The
Northwest Ordinance of 1787,65 enacted under the Articles of Confeder-
ation, banned slavery from the territory then belonging to the federal
government and required any state formed out of that territory to for-
swear slavery forever.66 The Ordinance had been adopted by the Conti-
nental Congress while the Convention was sitting and was doubtless
known to the delegates. Yet no one at the Convention questioned the
propriety or the continuing effectiveness of this stipulation. Accordingly,
the question arises whether a like provision could have been introduced
into the Constitution. Such a Territorial Clause could have governed not
only the Northwest, but any further territory acquired by the United
States as well, whether by cession from the original states or by treaty
with foreign nations.
The idea was never broached out loud, although one would suppose
it might have occurred when the Convention was considering the admis-
sion of new states67 or the power of Congress over the territories.68 Pre-
sumably some delegates thought they were empowering Congress to ban
slavery in any territory, present or future, through the clause that con-
ceded to the national legislature the authority to "make all needful Rules
61. 1 S. MORISON, supra note 2, at 245.
62. W. JORDAN, supra note 44, at 318, 373; 1 S. MORISON, supra note 2, at 245.
63. 1 S. MORISON, supra note 2, at 245.
64. According to the United States Census Bureau, the total population, black and white,
of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia in 1780 was 270,133, 180,000, and 56,071,
respectively. The black population of those States at that time was 91,000, 97,000, and 20,831,
respectively. 2 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIME TO 1970,
BICENTENNIAL EDITION 1168 (U.S. Bureau of Census 1975). Thus, the total white population
in the region in 1780 was 297,313 people.
65. See supra note 31.
66. The territory consisted of the area between the Ohio River, the Mississippi, and the
Great Lakes. Northwest Ordinance art. V, 1 Stat. 51(a), 53 (1789). See supra note 31.
67. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
68. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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and Regulations respecting the Territory ... [of] the United States."69
Congress consistently acted on that premise through 1850.70 But history
would soon reveal two problems with this silent approach. First, judges
bent on supporting slavery could read the Territorial Clause to be appli-
cable only to the territory of the nation when the Constitution was
adopted in 1789, the Northwest.71 Secondly, a divided and harassed
Congress would be tempted to compromise by continually balancing the
admission of "free" states with others where slavery was welcome.72 In-
deed, in 1790 the very first Congress, after re-enacting the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787,7" capitulated to North Carolina's insistence that the
cession of its western lands, the future Tennessee, should not be subject
to the anti-slavery provisions of the Northwest Ordinance.74 Similarly,
when Kentucky was carved out of Virginia a year later, the spirit of the
compromise dictated that there be no prohibition of slavery75 or mention
of the question in debate.76
The only hope at the Convention of 1787 was to seize the moment to
end the spread of slavery. It could not have been done without a fight.
However, that does not mean that it could not have been done. After all,
in 1787, the only future territories in view were the Kentucky region of
Virginia and the western lands of North Carolina, later Tennessee, and of
Georgia, later Mississippi and Alabama.77 Virginia probably would have
supported a generalized Territorial Clause, and while the other two states
would have complained, they might have conceded eventually and swal-
lowed hard on the false pretense that they could refuse to make any ces-
sion to the federal government. A persuasive advocate, I submit, could
69. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
70. See, for example, H. FAULKNER, AMERICAN AND POLITICAL SOCIAL HISTORY 225,
375, 377, 382-86 (7th ed. 1957), for a discussion of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, ch. 22, 3
Stat. 545, the Joint Resolution of 1845, S.J. Res. 8, 28th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 Stat. 797 (admitting
Texas into the Union), the Territorial Act of 1848, ch. 177, 9 Stat. 323 (creating the Oregon
Territory), and the Compromise of 1850, chs. 49-51, 9 Stat. 446-58 (admitting California into
the Union and creating the Utah and New Mexico Territories).
71. A majority of the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Taney in 1857, so read the
Territorial Clause contrary to prior and later opinion. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 432 (1857).
72. See sources cited supra note 70.
73. 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
74. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1477, 2203-2212 (1790); Act of Apr. 2, 1790, ch. 6, 1 Stat.
106. See also the Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 123, effectively making the Northwest
Ordinance applicable to the territory of the United States south of the Ohio River "except so
far as is otherwise provided" in the Act accepting the North Carolina cession.
75. Act of Feb. 4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189.
76. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1731, 1742, 1745, 1862, 1885 (1790).
77. See 10 A. McLAUGHLIN, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY 123-37 (1905).
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have pushed through a generalized version of the anti-slavery clause of
the Northwest Ordinance.
Even if their brothers Rutledge and Pinckney had opposed them,
there were three Middle Templars who might have carried the cause.
One was John Dickinson of Delaware, a "man of Continental reputa-
tion""8 who had spoken out against leaving the states free to continue the
slave trade,79 but had not taken up the idea of preventing internal slave
traffic. Another was John Blair of Virginia, a very able and senior dele-
gate who later served on the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, he never
spoke a word on any subject during the Convention.80 Finally, there was
Jared Ingersoll of Pennsylvania, described by a fellow delegate as "a very
able Attorney, with a clear legal understanding,"" and, more recently, as
"probably the ablest jury lawyer in Philadelphia."" He also never spoke,
however, until the very last day of the Convention and by then the dam-
age had been done.8 3 But one must not expect lawyers to innovate.
While they re-act well and quickly and even fashion new arguments in
support of their case, they first must be handed a brief. In this instance,
there was no proposal put forward and an opportunity was lost.
E. What Might Have Been
It is wholly fanciful to imagine the Framers drafting a provision
emancipating all slaves. However, if they had restricted slavery in the
several ways I have suggested, instead of expressly condoning and pro-
tecting the institution, it might have withered much sooner and without a
Civil War. Confining slavery to Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, the Caro-
linas and Georgia would have isolated these states, perhaps forcing them
to abandon the practice long before 1865.
A much more limited slave population, restricted by the ban on the
trade, successful escapes, and the absence of demand from new slave
states, would have presented less of a problem for emancipation. We
must remember that beyond an economic justification for the institu-
tion,8 4 slavery was perpetuated by fear of the free black man.' A smaller
78. C. ROSSITER, supra note 5, at 109.
79. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 372-73. See also id. at 416 (moving to amend the
Slave Trade Clause to confine it to States which had not themselves prohibited the importation
of slaves).
80. W. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 70.
81. Pierce, Character Sketches of Delegates to the Federal Convention, in 3 M. FARRAND,
supra note 29, at 87, 91.
82. W. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 92.
83. Id. See also 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 647.
84. 1 S. MORISON, supra note 2, at 245-46.
85. See, e.g., W. JORDAN, supra note 44, at 122-35, 406-11.
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number of slaves to be freed, the prospect of black migration to work in
neighboring free states with similar soil and climate, 6 and even the possi-
bility of black emigration to Africa would have lessened the anticipated
problem of the "freedman." But the greatest potential for shortening the
shamefully long life of American slavery lay in the powers of the Consti-
tution, which regretfully, were untapped.
s7
II. The Constitution and the Red Man
Although prior history restricted the Framers' options for treatment
of Native Americans, I submit that here, too, an opportunity was lost. In
this instance, however, mistakes were made due to the Framers' lack of
foresight.
For at least half a century before the Constitutional Convention of
1787, the British Crown and the American Colonies had treated as in-
dependent sovereigns the Indian tribes who were their neighbors, notably
the powerful Iroquois Confederacy known as the Six Nations and the
looser confederacies led by the Delaware, the Creeks, or the Cherokees.
They engaged in wars, alliances, conferences, and treaties with all the
formalities reserved for foreign powers .8  This was not artificial eti-
quette or gratuitous generosity; it was realism. At first the tribes simply
outnumbered the colonists.89 Later, although numerically less impor-
tant, the tribes learned to play the French against the English and vice-
versa.90 Thus, their military standing and, consequently, their grievances
had to be taken seriously.
In 1754, the British government summoned delegates from most of
the Colonies to Albany, New York to hear the complaints of the Six
86. Hypothetically, this would include Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Loui-
siana, Florida, Arkansas, Texas, and Missouri.
87. Cf. J. POLE, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 1783-1815, at 148-49
(1972), pointing to the "formative influences" of the Northwest Ordinance in the Ohio Valley.
88. See A. VAUGHAN, NEW ENGLAND FRONTIER 109-21 (1965); W. WASHBURN, THE
INDIAN IN AMERICA 81 (1975); see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16
(1831):
[Indians] have been uniformly treated as a State, from the settlement of our country.
The numerous treaties made with them by the United States, recognise [sic] them as
a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible
in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggres-
sion committed on the citizens of the United States, by any individual of their
community.
89. See Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 40-41 (1947).
90. See generally THE AMERICAN HERITAGE BoOK OF INDIANS 187-202 (A. Josephy ed.
1961).
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Nations.9 The Albany Congress ultimately devised a plan of union, the
main object of which was to avoid such problems for the future by con-
fining all relations with the Indians to a central government. 92 When this
plan failed to win acceptance by the colonial legislatures, the Crown is-
sued the famous Proclamation of 1763, which forbade settlement beyond
a line drawn along the Appalachian Mountains and required Crown au-
thority for any land purchase from the Indians.93
The Revolution ended the regime of the Proclamation, which, in
fact, had already been attenuated.94 But the problem persisted and sug-
gested the same solution. Both in the North and among the so-called
Civilized Tribes of the South95 there were Indian groups who sided with
the British Crown, or who threatened to do so. It remained important
for the revolutionaries to gain allies and prevent the increase of Indian
adherents to the British side. To that end, the Articles of Confederation
sought to centralize Indian affairs in the national government.96 Argua-
bly going beyond its authority under the Articles, the Congress repeat-
edly attempted to end dealings with the tribes by individual states, as
well as private land cessions.1
7
91. See R. NEWBOLD, THE ALBANY CONGRESS AND PLAN OF UNION OF 1754, at 22-24,
49-51, 57-67, 173-74 (1955). These complaints mainly concerned private land cessions, and
white settlements without benefit of sale. Id. at 64-66.
92. Id. at 93-94, 127-30, 186, 191.
93. Well before the Proclamation, the British Government in London had taken steps in
the same direction. Id. at 71, 173-76; F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORM-
ATIVE YEARS 11-13 (1962); J. KINNEY, A CONTINENT LOST-A CIVILIZATION WON 18-22
(1937). For a discussion of the Proclamation and its immediate implementation, see F.
PRUCHA, supra, at 13-25; 1 S. MORISON, supra note 2, at 154-57; J. KINNEY, supra, at 22-25.
94. F. PRUCHA, supra note 93, at 23-25; J. KINNEY, supra note 93, at 24-26.
95. The "civilized" tribes of the South included the Creek, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and
Choctaw.
96. Article XVIII in the first draft of the Articles, reported to Congress on July 12, 1776,
by a committee headed by Dickinson, M. JENSEN, supra note 35, at 126, was apparently un-
qualified. It unreservedly conferred upon the national government "the sole and exclusive
Right and Power of... Regulating the Trade, and managing all Affairs with the Indians." Id.
at 133-34, 258. Even then, however, it was apparently deemed -right to concede to the states
jurisdiction over the land purchases from the Indians within State boundaries, as fixed by
Congress, under articles XIV, XV, and XVIII. Id. at 257-58 & n.2. Congress later ambigu-
ously tempered the first draft by confining it to Indians "not members of any States," and by
adding the proviso that "the legislative right of any State, within its own limits be not infringed
or violated." Id. at 139, 159, 268. See also F. PRUCHA, supra note 93, at 29-30.
97. These efforts began with the establishment, in 1778, of three Indian Departments and
the appointment of several Commissioners for each. F. PRUCHA, supra note 93, at 27-28. At
the end of the War, on September 22, 1783, the Congress issued a proclamation very like the
Crown proclamation of twenty years earlier. Id. at 31-32; J. KINNEY, supra note 93, at 28.
And, in August 1786, Congress promulgated a comprehensive Ordinance for the Regulation of
Indian Affairs. F. PRUCHA, supra note 93, at 36-37. Indian Treaties at this time were written
expressly to recognize the "sole and exclusive" power of the national government to manage
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Most land transactions with the Indians, whether conducted by the
national or state authorities, continued to follow the pattern of formal
treaty negotiations, thereby recognizing the tribes as at least quasi-sover-
ign entities.98 This was, no doubt, partly force of habit. But the formal
treatment of the Tribes also reflected their importance as potential ene-
mies, especially in the western territories99 and in the far south where
Spain held posts and made alliances with the Indians.lco There was no
question, at this time, of imposing the white man's law on the tribes in
the "Indian country." The Native Americans were entirely self-ruled be-
yond the frontier and were commonly conceded the right to "punish...
in such a manner as they [saw] fit" white intruders who presumed to
settle upon the lands confirmed to the tribes by treaty.101
By 1787, a substantial proportion of the Indian population of the
United States, then bounded on the west by the Mississippi, was within
the Northwest Territory already ceded to the federal government by the
states. There the tribes were expressly promised by the Ordinance of
Indian affairs. See, e.g., Treaty of Hopewell of 1785 with the Cherokee, Art. IX, 7 Stat. 18
(1785), in 2 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAW AND TREATIES 10 (1904). In August 1787,
before ratification of the new Constitution, a committee of Congress equivocally declared the
exclusive authority of the federal government. F. PRUCHA, supra note 93, at 3 8-39. See gener-
ally G. HARMON, SIXTY YEARS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 1-6, 8 (1941); W. WASHBURN, supra
note 88, at 148-59. The documents here referred to, together with others, are conveniently
collected in F. PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 1-11 (1975).
98. For a short time, there was an inclination to treat the Tribes that sided with Britain in
the Revolutionary War, including the four "disloyal" Nations within the Iroquois Confeder-
acy, as defeated enemies, whose lands could be taken without consent. But, partly at the
urging of General Washington and Henry Knox, the Secretary of War, this approach was
promptly abandoned as unwise. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 93, at 34-40; W. WASHBURN,
supra note 88, at 156-63; S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 35-36 (1973). For the
views of Washington and Knox, see F. PRUCHA, supra note 97, at 1-2, 11-13, 15-16.
99. Britain had legally relinquished these territories at the 1783 Treaty of Paris, but con-
tinued to occupy them for more than a decade. Smith, The Shaping of America, in 3 A PEO-
PLE'S HISTORY OF THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 168, 184, 220 (1980).
100. 1 S. MORISON, supra note 2, at 267-68.
101. See, e.g., Treaty of Fort McIntosh of Jan. 21, 1785, with the Wyandot, Delaware,
Chippewa, and Ottawa, art. V, 7 Stat. 16, reprinted in 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note 97, at 7;
Treaty of Hopewell of Nov. 28, 1785, with the Cherokee, art. V, 7 Stat. 18, reprinted in 2 C.
KAPPLER, supra note 97, at 9; Treaty of Hopewell of Jan. 3, 1786, with the Choctaw, art. IV, 7
Stat. 21, reprinted in 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note 97, at 12; Treaty of Hopewell of Jan. 10, 1786,
with the Chickasaw, art. IV, 7 Stat. 21, reprinted in 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note 97, at 17; Treaty
of Jan. 31, 1786, with the Shawnee, art. VII, 7 Stat. 26, reprinted in 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note
97, at 17; Treaty of Fort Harmar of Jan. 9, 1789, with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chip-
pewa, Pattawatima, and Sac, art. IX, 7 Stat. 28, reprinted in 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note 97, at
21; Treaty of Aug. 7, 1790, with the Creeks, art. VIII, 7 Stat. 35, reprinted in 2 C. KAPPLER,
supra note 97, at 27; Treaty of Holston of July 2, 1791, with the Cherokee, art. VIII, 2 Stat. 39,
reprinted in 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note 97, at 30; Treaty of Greenville of Aug. 3, 1795, with the
Wyandot, Delaware, Shawanoes, Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima, Miamis, Eel-River, art. VI,
27 Stat. 49, reprinted in 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note 97, at 42.
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July 13, 1787, the most just and friendly treatment.10 2 But that commit-
ment was not secure against repeal. And, besides, there was also very
substantial "Indian country" within New York State, the Carolinas and
Georgia, and smaller enclaves in New England, where the independent
status of these Indians was not always fully conceded; however, in prac-
tice, they were mostly left alone.
Although the delegates at the 1787 Constitutional Convention ex-
pected the issue of authority in Indian relations to rise again, 10 3 almost
nothing was said about it at the Convention. Indeed, the text of the Con-
stitution only mentions Indians twice, seemingly in passing.
A. "Indians Not Taxed"
The Constitution first refers to the Indians in Article I, where the
apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes is based on population
"excluding Indians not taxed."'" This formulation can be traced to a
1776 draft of the Articles of Confederation by John Dickinson, of the
Middle Temple, which allocated contributions to the national govern-
ment on the basis of the total population of each "Colony," including
slaves but excepting "Indians not paying taxes." 105 The same exclusion
was carried forward in the 1783 proposal to amend the Articles of Con-
federation. 10 6 The formula, now applicable to both representation and
102. The Ordinance provides the following:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property,
rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful
wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from
time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving
peace and friendship with them.
Northwest Ordinance art. 3, 1 Stat. 51(a), 52 (1789); 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 340-41 (1936); F. PRUCHA, supra note 97, 9-10.
103. It was expected that the Northwest Territory would soon be divided into States,
thereby presenting the same potential issue of State versus federal authority over Indian
relations.
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Even today, "Indians not taxed" are constitutionally
excluded from the population for the purpose of apportionment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2. Since 1940, the Bureau of the Census has counted all Indians within each state, on
the ground that they are subject to federal taxation. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 389 & n.11 (1942). This approach is questionable since the taxes alluded to in
the Constitution were presumably those imposed by the States on tribal Indians. Therefore,
Native Americans should remain immune from taxation, except if Congress has expressly pro-
vided otherwise. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); McClanahan v. Ari-
zona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
105. Draft of ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI, in M. JENSEN, supra note 35, at 256.
106. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 260 (1922). This same proposal was
the source of the three-fifths rule for counting Indian inhabitants. See supra notes 20-23 and
accompanying text.
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contributions, was fixed as early as June 11, 1787,107 and was accepted
without a word of debate.
10 8
At the simplest level, the Convention did no more than apply one of
the fundamental principles of the American revolution: that taxation and
representation were inseperable. The Framers also endorsed the then-
accepted notion that Indians were aliens, even within the borders of the
United States.'° 9 Indians were deemed beyond the power of taxation 0
because they belonged to a separate sovereignty, unless they had volunta-
rily abandoned their tribal relations and assimilated into the white man's
world, as very few had done.
The Indian was apparently left free to choose between continuing
his tribal existence, immune from the white man's law so long as he did
not harm the whites or their property, or joining the white world and
being treated as a full citizen. But the clause merely assumed such a
choice, it did not guarantee it. Thus, the Constitution suggests Indians
are aliens, yet does not protect their separate status against either federal
or state interference. Nor does it direct the Nation or its several states to
accept the Indian as a citizen if he wants to assimilate.
B. The Indian Commerce Clause
The Constitution next refers to Indians in the so-called "Indian
Commerce Clause" of Article I. On its face, the Clause appears a very
weak thing, merely providing that "Congress shall have the power.., to
regulate commerce... with the Indian tribes.""' It seems to grant Con-
gress little more than the power to control the Indian fur trade and ban
the sale of guns and whiskey to Indians. Beyond this, the provision only
tells us that Indian Tribes are something other than "foreign nations",
yet are communities distinct from the ordinary inhabitants of the United
States. In short, they were as the Supreme Court was later to conclude,
"domestic dependent nations," whose members were in a "state of pupil-
107. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 193.
108. Id. at 227, 229, 236, 444; 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 183, 571, 590, 651. There
is equally no discussion of the exclusion of Indians in THE FEDERALIST. Indeed, except for
mentioning them as a past or present threat, the only reference to Indians in those papers is
Madison's brief elucidation of the Indian Commerce Clause. See infra note 113. Nor does it
appear that the Indian question was agitated during the State ratification process. See F.
PRUCHA, supra note 93, at 42 n.2.
109. That notion was expressly stated by the Supreme Court in 1884. Elk v. Wilkins, 112
U.S. 94 (1884).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The same clause gives Congress the power to regulate
foreign and interstate commerce.
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lage" as "wards" of the Government.
112
On closer examination, it is arguable that the Indian Commerce
Clause has more bite. John Madison proposed the Clause in general
terms as giving the power "to regulate affairs with the Indians, as well
within as without the limits of the United States.""' 3 Madison was a
member of the Committee of Eleven 1 4 which deleted a qualification lim-
iting the scope of the Clause to Indians within a state "not subject to the
laws thereof.""' 5 In The Federalist,"6 Madison described the federal gov-
ernment's authority as "unfettered" because it was now rid of the two
limitations that had caused confusion under the Confederacy." 7 Thus,
we seem to have the best authority for reading the Indian Commerce
Clause as placing the Indian Tribes under a constitutionally secure fed-
eral umbrella.
For almost a century, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that the
effect of the Indian Commerce Clause was to abrogate state jurisdiction
completely."' But, alas, this is not the unambiguous meaning of the
words. And so, more recently, the Supreme Court was able to dismiss
the Clause as affording little or no protection to the Indian tribes from
hostile state legislation." 9
112. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). See also United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
113. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 321, 324.
114. On several occasions, the Convention designated a committee composed of one mem-
ber from each of the eleven states attending and referred to it unresolved questions. In the
Records and in Madison's notes such a committee is usually denominated the "Committee of
Eleven." See, e.g., 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 483. In this instance, Madison was
appointed as the Virginia representative. Id at 473, 481.
115. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 367. See id. at 473, 481, 493, 495, 497, 499, 503,
569, 595.
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 284-85 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
117. Id. In the Articles of Confederation, the power of Congress over Indian affairs was
expressly restricted to Indians who were "not members of any of the states" and was also
embarassed by a proviso guarding against infringement of the legislative right of any state
within its own limits .... ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1781, repealed 1787).
118. United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 194 (1876). In
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-60, 561, 590-92, 594 (1832), Chief Justice
Marshall used the Indian Commerce Clause to reach his holding that Georgia's laws had no
force within the territory confirmed to the Cherokee Nation by federal treaties. President
Andrew Jackson disputed the Chief Justice's interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause
and ignored the decision, making it clear that unless the Cherokees were "removed" to lands
west of the Mississippi, all the Indian Tribes would be subjected to hostile State jurisdiction.
See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755 (1866); see also F. COHEN, supra note 104,
at 81-92.
119. In recent years, the Supreme Court has generously used the Supremacy Clause to
protect Indian tribes from state taxation and regulation. See Ramah Navajo School Bd. v.
Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845-46 (1982).
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At all events, even if the Indian Commerce Clause affords ambigu-
ous protection against state action, it does not restrain the federal govern-
ment. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has construed the provision
as supporting laws dealing with the property and liberty of Indians,
which would be politically unthinkable and plainly unconstitutional if
white citizens were involved. The familiar tale of oppressive federal
acts-quite aside from state abuses-is too voluminous to discuss in this
Article. 120 All this was justified by the federal government's view of the
Indians as alien "captives", constitutionally subject to the "plenary
power" of Congress, usually attributed to the Commerce Clause. 121
C. The Supremacy of Treaties Clause
Although it does not mention Indian Tribes in terms, some have
invoked as relevant to the status of Indians the provision of the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution that declares "Treaties [already]
made.., under the Authority of the United States" to override inconsis-
tent state laws. 122 Thus, in Worcester v. Georgia,123 Chief Justice Mar-
shall found here a sanction of earlier treaties with Indian Tribes and,
consequently, constitutional recognition of their status as "nations" en-
joying the "rank among these powers who are capable of making
treaties.
z124
There is, in fact, no evidence that the Framers had Indian treaties in
mind when they wrote the Supremacy Clause. The Clause, as we know
120. We may mention broken treaties, various westward forced removals of tribes, land
confiscations, mishandling of Indian "trust" funds, atrocities committed in the name of aveng-
ing "Indian massacres", involuntary relocations to reservations, prisoner treatment of many
tribes, and the insultingly pervasive regulation of every aspect of Indian life. A good short
legal history of federal Indian relations is considered in F. COHEN, supra note 104, at 47-206.
Of special interest in examining particular aspects of the national oppression of the Indian are
W. WASHBURN, supra note 88, at 170-96, 209-49; CITIZEN'S ADVOCACY CENTER, OUR
BROTHER'S KEEPER: THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA 5-154 (1969); and D. BROWN, BURY
MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (Cahn ed. 1971).
121. See, eg., Delaware Tribal Business Comm'n v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977);
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1975); Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S.
481 (1925); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174
U.S. 445 (1899); United States v. Fourty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876);
United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865); see also United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (rejecting the Commerce Clause as the source of congressional power
over the Indians themselves, but basing it, instead, on a "wardship" theory). The Indian Com-
merce Clause has been mentioned more recently as a source of federal power in Indian affairs,
but not as a constitutional shield. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
172 n.7 (1972). See also infra note 142.
122. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
123. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
124. Id. at 559.
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it, was a substitute for a provision urged by Madison and others that
would have expressly authorized Congress to "negative" State laws.125
At no time were treaties alluded to-not even when Madison successfully
proposed an amendment "to obviate all doubt concerning the force of
Treaties pre-existing" the Constitution. 2 6 Indeed, there is some indica-
tion that the Framers, and Madison in particular, were only thinking of
"Treaties with foreign nations", since that is how Madison's notes refer
to the treaties on the basis of which Congress could "negative" inconsis-
tent state laws under the earlier proposal.127 It is sometimes forgotten
that, besides half a dozen Indian treaties, the Continental Congress had
executed an equal number of treaties with foreign powers before 1787,
most notably the Treaty of Paris of 1783 with Britain, ending the Revolu-
tionary War, and two treaties with France.
1 28
We must suspect that the great Chief Justice was an "activist" on
the score of Indian rights. He used his position to "legislate" on behalf
of the Indian tribes no less than more recent justices on other matters.
But even if Marshall's history was correct, his dictum in the second
Cherokee case129 did not confer lasting constitutional status as "sover-
eign" nations to the Indian tribes. In 1871, Congress determined to end
the regime of dealing with the Indian tribes by formal treaties, expressing
the view that "no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States" ought, in future, to be "acknowledged or recognized as an in-
125. See E. DUMBAULD, supra note 24, at 443-44.
126. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 417. See also id. at 431.
127. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 164. This reference is perhaps most revealing of
Madison's thinking. It does not copy the more general words of the Resolution, as amended
by Franklin, which spoke of "any Treaties subsisting under the authority of the union." Id. at
47, 54. THE FEDERALIST contains no reference to treaties with Indian Tribes. Where the
context reveals the meaning, the term invariably connotes an agreement with a foreign nation.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 136, 143-44 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); id. No. 42, at
279 (J. Madison); id. No. 53, at 364 (J. Madison); id. No. 64, at 432-38 (J. Jay); id. No. 66, at
450-51 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 69, at 467-70 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 73, at 503-09 (A. Hamil-
ton); id. No. 78, at 520 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 80, at 540 (A. Hamilton). So, also, it is signifi-
cant that, although the practice of Senate ratification for Indian treaties soon developed, see 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 1034-36 (J. Gales ed. 1834), neither President Washington nor the Senate
committee that first dealt with the question was immediately clear that this constitutional
procedure was appropriate. Id. at 39-41, 72, 77, 80-81, 82. See also id. at 691.
128. See, e.g., J. POLE, supra note 87, at 73, 111-12, 143. According to John Jay, in THE
FEDERALIST No. 3, at 14 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), by November 3, 1787, "America ha[d] already
formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations." Assuming only one agreement with
each country referred to by Jay, except for France, that would make a total of seven, the same
number as for federal Indian treaties through 1787. See 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note 97, at 3-18.
129. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 576 (1832) (stating that the Cherokee
Nation enjoyed national sovereignty).
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dependent nation, tribe, or power."13 And, without demur from the
High Court, Congress thereafter acted on this premise, enacting legisla-
tion abrogating treaties,131 imposing alien laws on the Indians,1 32 deter-
mining tribal membership and alotting tribal property, 133 unilaterally
"terminating" federal supervision over tribes, 3 and then subjecting
them to state jurisdiction. 35 Accordingly, we must conclude that the
Supremacy of Treaties Clause does not shield the Indians in any special
way. 136
D. Alternative Solutions
So far as they go, there is little basis to quarrel with either of the two
clauses of the Constitution that expressly deal with Indians, or with the
Supremacy Clause. Or at least, there would be little complaint if the
Framers had accorded due protection to both the tribes and the individ-
ual Indian elsewhere in the Consititution. Considering the contempora-
neous accord of the several states in the form of the Northwest
Ordinance, there is some reason to suppose that a proposal which more
expressly protected Native American rights would have won acquies-
cence if persuasively advanced.
The Native Americans could easily have been protected from state
aggression. For instance, even if they were denied citizenship until they
abandoned their tribal allegiance and submitted to taxation, the Indians
could have been made the beneficiaries of a special "comity provision"
130. Indian Appropriation Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871), reprinted in part in F.
PRUCHA, supra note 97, at 136.
131. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding legislation abrogating
stipulations of the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge, 15 Stat. 99, with the Kiowas, Comanche,
and Apaches); see also The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
132. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding the Major Crimes Act,
contained in the Indian Appropriaton Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385, and
imposing federal criminal statutes on Indian Reservations).
133. See, e.g., Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899) (upholding a series of
enactments conferring federal jurisdiction on administrative courts in Indian territories).
134. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (limiting the effect of the
Menominee Indian Termination Act, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (1954) (repealed 1973), but assum-
ing its constitutionality); see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
135. See, e.g., Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) (applying Act of
Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588, to the Yakima Indian Nation).
136. Of course, so long as Congress is content to follow former Indian treaties, this Clause
makes Indian treaties-as well as Acts of Congress-the "supreme law of the land," binding
on the states and on both federal and local officials. While Congress may abrogate such trea-
ties, lands recognized by such agreements as belonging to a tribe cannot be taken by the United
States without payment of just compensation. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476
(1937). This case shows the replacement of the Supremacy Clause with an application of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment to Indian tribal property. U.S. CoNST.
amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation").
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akin to the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV. 137 The latter
Clause operates in favor of citizens of other states, assuring them, while
in a state not their own, the benefit of "all Privileges and Immunities"
enjoyed by the local citizens. Although it now reaches only citizens, the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause was borrowed from the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, where it ran in favor of all "free inhabitants.
'138
It presumably would have embraced Indians had it not been altered, first,
to "free citizens," 139 then to just "citizens."'" While the change may
have been intended to permit discrimination against free Blacks, no one
suggested that Indians were a reason to restrict the coverage to citizens.
The delegates could easily have added to such a "comity" clause an
express provision shielding the tribes and their members from oppressive
state action. No doubt some states would have remonstrated, but it is not
unthinkable that a monopoly of Indian affairs-including not only the
regulation of commerce, but all dealings with the Tribes-could have
been expressly and exclusively lodged in the federal government. John
Madison's claim that this was in fact accomplished is not entirely persua-
sive. Despite repeated efforts, I have never been able to persuade today's
Supreme Court that this is so."4 Unfortunately, the opportunity to in-
sert a comprehensive and unambiguous provision excluding state juris-
diction within "Indian Country" was never pressed by the Framers.
This leaves the more difficult question of shielding the Indian from
federal oppression. No irrepressible pressure to remove the Indian tribes
from their lands east of the Mississippi existed in 1787. At that time the
federal government was still concerned with placating the large Indian
137. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
138. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different States in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these States,
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privi-
leges and immunities of free citizens in the several states ....
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 4 (1781, repealed 1787).
139. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 173-74.
140. Id. at 187. Presumably, the deletion of "free" by the Committee of Detail simply
reflected the recognition that all citizens were free-albeit all free persons were not citizens.
141. See Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845-46 (1982); see
also Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 157 (1980); White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141-45 (1980); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,
168 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Later cases apparently have eroded the statement in the
majority opinion in Merrion to the effect that "this Court has relied on the Indian Commerce
Clause as a shield to protect Indian Tribes from state and local interference .. " Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. at 153-54. This statement was apparently no more than a
recitation of ancient history, not a declaration of current constitutional doctrine. See, eg.,
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), and the discussion supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
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confederacies, with whom war would be unprofitable.142 And, witness,
the Northwest Ordinance, the temper of the moment was more gener-
ously inclined toward the Indians than it would be a few years hence.
This, then, was the perfect moment to constitutionalize a reasonably
favorable regime for the Indian tribes.
Borrowing from the Ordinance, the Framers readily could have
fashioned words to secure the tribal lands against involuntary cessions
and the tribes against unwilling termination of their status as separate
communities. The more awkward question was how far to forbid federal
interference with tribal self-government, even where it did not directly
impinge on the white world. The Framers were probably much less in-
clined to intrude than their successors today, not to mention the meddle-
some reformers at the turn of the next century.14 3 The failure to create
such a clause was due mainly to innocence in regard to what was to
follow. No doubt, some of the subsequent events were inevitable, Consti-
tution or no Constitution. But they surely could have been tempered
with a clear legal brake. Once again, the Middle Templars failed to do
their best!
Conclusion
The Framers of the Constitution enjoyed a rare opportunity in 1787,
which would not recur until the post-Civil War Reconstruction, when
the Constitution was in some respects remade. 1" There existed at the
Convention a general determination to succeed in fashioning a charter
for the new nation. Strong differences and heated disagreements on
equally fundamental issues were resolved because of the perceived impor-
tance of not failing. This, then, was the time of all times to insist on
settling the two racial questions that faced America.
142. See, for example, the many statements of Henry Knox, Secretary of War both under
the Confederacy and during Washington's administration under the Constitution, in G. HAR-
MON, supra note 97, at 16-18, 54-57, and F. PRUCHA, supra note 93, at 39. See also F.
PRUCHA, supra note 97, at 11-13.
143. In the early years of the Union, federal legislation dealt with white-Indian relations
only. As late as 1883, in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), the Supreme Court held
that the white man's law did not reach a tribal Indian who had killed another Indian within
"Indian country." This was, however, immediately followed by the enactment of the Major
Crimes Act, contained in the Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, ch. 341, 23 Stat.
362, 385, the General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 389 (1887), and much more "paternalis-
tic" legislation. See F. COHEN, supra note 104, at 117-23.
144. It should be noted that those who framed the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments immediately after the Civil War did not take the opportunity to grant a "new
deal" to the Indian. On the contrary, the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" is repeated in the
Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 104.
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Moreover, it was a propitious moment for persuading any dissenters
to indulge in generosity toward both black and red inhabitants. Before
the invention of the cotton gin, the persistence of slavery was at best
doubtful on economic grounds.1 45 The resistance to ending the slave
trade was more a matter of principle than of material self-interest, and
we know that disinterested principles are not impossible to overcome.
Many opponents of slavery no doubt were inclined to "let nature take its
course." But it should have been appreciated that economics does not
always determine history: there was a risk that the conservative instinct
present in all societies would insist on preserving and spreading slavery,
especially after the constitutional debate ultimately sanctioned the insti-
tution. I cannot fault the Founding Fathers for having failed to antici-
pate the future profitability of slavery. 4 6 I do blame them, however, for
not seizing the moment to ensure the early demise of such an unconscion-
able regime.
For somewhat different reasons, 1787 was also a favorable time to
deal with the "Indian question." Many years would elapse before it
would be acceptable to assert that "the only good Indian is a dead In-
dian."147 The Native American, if a "savage",148 was still viewed as "no-
ble." Indeed, the Indians were officially addressed as "Brothers", 49 not
"children." The Delaware Tribe had been invited to join the new Union
as a separate state,1 50 and the federal government conceded the Cher-
okees a non-voting delegate in Congress.1 51 The prevailing policy was to
avoid war by treating the Indian tribes fairly. George Washington firmly
believed in this approach, 52 and undoubtedly had the clout to secure
constitutional endorsement of the principle had he chosen to intervene at
145. See, e.g., J. POLE, supra note 87, at 176-78. But see W. JORDAN, supra note 44, at 316-
21.
146. See J. POLE, supra note 87, at 179; W. JORDAN, supra note 44, at 375-402. Nor can I
fault them for not having foreseen the fears of emancipation that would be provoked by the
slave revolutions on the island of Santo Domingo.
147. As with most popular aphorisms, this is an improvement on a remark attributed to
General Sheridan at Fort Cobb in 1868. D. BROWN, supra note 120, at 170-72.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN 209-14, 325, 332-34
(1964).
150. Treaty with the Delaware of Sept. 17, 1778, art. VI, in 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note 97,
at 4-5.
151. Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees of Nov. 28, 1785, art. XII, in 2 C. KAPPLER,
supra note 97, at 10.
152. See, e.g., F. PRUCHA, supra note 97, at 1-2, 15-16. Washington's concern that the
Indian question be dealt with in the right way is revealed by his personal appearance before the
Senate in 1789 to secure the ratification of treaties and the approval of his policy-the only
such appearance he ever made. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 65-71 (1790). See also W. MACLAY,
JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 28-32 (1890).
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the Convention. 5 3 The "manifest impossibility" of accomodating whites
and Native Americans east of the Mississippi154 was not yet obvious.
Unfortunately, the Framers did not appreciate that they controlled the
perfect moment to deflect the history of injustice that was to come.
The moral of the tale, which may have escaped you, is this: Never
trust lawyers with the fate of any nation. Especially the best lawyers
who, of course, are the barristers of the Middle Temple. The abler the
lawyer, the better trained he is to urge his client's cause, whether right or
wrong. The best lawyer concentrates entirely on the moment: all effort
is to win the particular case, by persuasion if possible, otherwise by com-
promise, and damn the consequences. Far-sightedness is not the mark of
a good lawyer.
And so, it is not really surprising that too many lawyers spoiled the
soup, at least on the question of racial equality. Nor that the most culpa-
ble were the five Middle Templars, whether by all-too-successful but
short sighted advocacy or indifferent silence. As an American member
of the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple, I now offer public apol-
ogy for the errors of my brothers. Unfortunately, I am two hundred
years too late.
153. According to John Madison, George Washington, who chaired the Convention, only
intervened once in the discussions. When he did intervene on a question of apportionment, the
delegates accepted his view without debate. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 644. If need be,
one would have expected the General to be seconded inside the Convention by the venerable
Benjamin Franklin, and outside by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. See W. WASHBURN,
supra note 149, at 94-96, 422-25; F. PRUCHA, supra note 93, at 28-30, 50, 140-41.
154. For a discussion of the removal of the Indians to the West, see F. PRUCHA, supra note
93, at 224-49. For an example of the different attitude prevailing at least among some
frontiersmen West of the Alleghanies, see W. WASHBURN, supra note 149, at 111-17.

